RDP 2020-05: How Risky is Australian Household Debt? 3. Stress Testing Household Debt
August 2020
- Download the Paper 1,881KB
In assessing the risks posed by debt, it is important to consider the distribution of debt, not just the aggregate level. For example, banks are more vulnerable to losses if debt is held by borrowers who are financially constrained, more prone to shocks or have fewer assets. Many studies have also argued that the distribution of debt can affect the sensitivity of consumption to shocks to income and wealth (Mian, Rao and Sufi (2013), among others). Thus, in this second part of the paper, we use household-level stress tests to assess to what extent Australia's current distribution of debt affects its sensitivity to shocks. We examine the impact of a severe hypothetical macroeconomic shock in two ways, first on the banking sector and second on the Australian economy more broadly.
The first approach estimates the losses that the banking sector would suffer on their exposures to households, by stressing household balance sheets and income (Section 3.1). This approach updates the Bilston et al (2015) household-level model for Australia and is similar to other models used in Canada (Peterson and Roberts 2016), the euro area (Gross and Población 2017) and Austria (Albacete and Fessler 2010).
The second approach is more novel and assesses how the presence of (and increase in) debt may affect households' consumption in a period of stress (Section 3.2). This is motivated by a recognition that, while much has been done over the past decade to make the banking sector more resilient, it could still be the case that the household sector has simultaneously become more susceptible to shocks as household debt has increased.
Both approaches use the same severe hypothetical stress scenario that is similar in magnitude to previous bank stress tests in Australia. (In particular, those conducted by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) in 2014 and 2017 (Byres 2018), and by the International Monetary Fund for Australia's 2018 Financial Stability Assessment Program (IMF 2019).) The scenario involves employment falling by 8 per cent and housing prices falling by 40 per cent (Table 4). We believe this is an extreme but plausible scenario, which is broadly in line with the shock experienced by some countries during the global financial crisis.[22] The employment fall is similar to the fall Australia experienced during the 1990s (7 per cent fall in employment-to-population ratio) and during the COVID-19 pandemic (7 per cent fall as of June 2020), but is significantly more extreme than during the global financial crisis. The housing price fall considered is more extreme than the 1990s (20 per cent fall in real housing prices) and during the global financial crisis, but is comparable to falls experienced in countries that were heavily affected by the crisis, including the United States (32 per cent fall), Spain (37 per cent fall) and Ireland (55 per cent fall).
Change | |
---|---|
Income related | |
Employment (%) | –8 |
Investment income (%) | –30 |
Bonus and overtime income (%) | –50 |
Lending rates (ppt) | 0 |
Wealth related | |
Asset prices (%) | |
Housing | –40 |
Equities | –40 |
Superannuation(a) and trust funds | –30 |
Other | 0 |
Note: (a) Average change, change depends on household age profile given different returns on different asset classes |
Our framework is partial equilibrium and thus does not directly capture potential effects of monetary and fiscal stimulus (except for higher unemployment benefits when an individual loses their job). This approach is appropriate for two reasons. First, the economic outcomes in the scenario already implicitly incorporate historical policy responses because we benchmark to episodes where stimulus was implemented (for example, US policy rates fell by 5 percentage points in the global financial crisis, and Australian policy rates fell 10 percentage points in the 1990s recession). Second, our main focus is in comparing how the distribution of debt affects the outcomes for a given scenario rather than in the magnitude of stress per se. Third, the ability of banks to lower lending rates with the policy rate could be compromised in this scenario if declining capital ratios result in increased funding costs stemming from greater perceived riskiness.
Shocks are applied in a single-period framework with changes occurring instantaneously. The impact of the shock can then be estimated by comparing pre- and post-shock default rates, loan losses and consumption. This simplifies the exercise and is appropriate since temporal dynamics should not alter the fundamental question of whether debt influences the extent of stress for banks and households. However, it is sensible to interpret this shock over a horizon of 2–3 years given that this is when stress test scenarios normally reach their peak intensity (Borio et al 2014).
We use household-level data for 2015–16 from the Survey of Income and Housing (SIH), which is collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics and covers 17,768 households. This differs from Bilston et al (2015), who used the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. We use the SIH because it contains more granular loan data and can be matched with the Household Expenditure Survey (HES) for more accurate consumption data. It also contains additional person- and loan-level data. Furthermore, the longitudinal features of the HILDA Survey are not relevant for this work. Our results are little different when we use the 2017–18 SIH data, but we do not use these as our default data because the lack of concurrent HES data makes it infeasible for many of the questions we ask.
The magnitude of the fall in the value of each household's assets depends on their allocation among the different types of assets and the change in asset prices in Table 4. Similarly, each household's income fall is based on shocks to their variable income (from investments, bonuses and overtime) and whether members of the household lose their job, in which case their income falls to an estimate of the unemployment benefits for which they qualify.[23]
To determine which individuals lose their job, we first use a person-level probit model to regress unemployment propensity on a range of variables (see Appendix B). These include demographic factors (such as age, education, income, location of residence and ethnicity), whether the person was previously unemployed and whether the person has a mortgage (as a proxy for characteristics which may reduce their chance of unemployment and which are observable to the bank, but which are not recorded in the survey). The regression uses 33,913 person-level observations from the SIH (though only 20,785 are in the labour force). Crucially, this is a reduced-form predictive model and is not designed to draw causal inferences. The unemployment probabilities are then scaled to match the pre-specified aggregate fall in employment in our scenario, with post-stress results presented as the average of 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations using these probabilities. Income shocks at the person level can then be aggregated up to the household to calculate the change in household income.
3.1 Banking Sector Resilience
To assess the impact of the macroeconomic stress event on household defaults and so on the banking sector, we use the approach of Bilston et al (2015). This firstly involves calculating the financial margin (FM) for each household:
where Y is household disposable income, DS is minimum debt-servicing costs (if any), MC is minimum consumption, R is rental payments and j indexes households. We assume that if a household's financial margin becomes negative in the stress scenario, it defaults on its debt obligations within the 2–3 year time horizon (if its LVR at the time of default is above 90 per cent).[24] This may overstate the default rate because some households may have sufficient liquid assets or prepayment buffers to avoid default. We consider these buffers in an extension. We also assume that borrowers with a current LVR less than 90 per cent are able to self-cure by selling the property and so do not default causing losses for the lender.[25]
Minimum debt-servicing costs (DS) include a household's minimum required mortgage repayments based on applying a credit foncier model to the loan balance, reported interest rate and term of each household's housing loans.[26] We use a measure of minimum required repayments, rather than actual repayments, because many Australian households pay more principal than required in normal times and can stop making these additional repayments if they experience financial stress. Debt-servicing costs also include interest payments on personal and credit card debt, and we assume households also repay 2 per cent of the principal on these additional loans each year.
Minimum consumption (MC) is based on the Household Expenditure Measure (HEM), which is the minimum living expenses measure used by the Australian banks in assessing loan serviceability metrics.[27] The measure increases with family size and income and is based on a household's spending equalling the median household's expenditure on ‘absolute basics’ and the 25th percentile of spending on ‘discretionary basics’. We use a measure of minimum consumption, rather than actual consumption, as when faced with income loss households could meet their debt obligations by reducing their discretionary spending.[28]
Our ultimate aim is to calculate the share of household debt that is at risk, as a proxy for loan losses at banks. To do this, we calculate the value of debt held by defaulted households and subtract the collateral value from housing (after applying the asset price shocks from the macroeconomic scenario). We also assume banks suffer foreclosure costs of 10 per cent of the loan (such as legal fees, broker fees and property taxes), consistent with past studies (Qi and Yang 2009; IMF 2019).
3.1.1 Results
The macroeconomic scenario leads to household debt-at-risk as a share of housing debt increasing by only a small amount, from 0.8 per cent to 2.1 per cent (Figure 8).[29] Foreclosure costs account for about ½ percentage point of that increase. These estimates are low because housing loans account for the majority of household debt in Australia and these tend to be very well collateralised. Many high LVR loans in Australia are also covered by lenders mortgage insurance (LMI), which also reduces bank losses. Without LMI protection losses would be about 1 percentage point higher.[30] The debt-at-risk estimate is a little lower in magnitude to mortgages loss rates in recent stress tests by regulators in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. However, the estimate is substantially lower than actual loss rates in Ireland and the United States during the global financial crisis. This is mainly because Australian mortgages have low LVRs by international and historical standards. For example, less than 10 per cent of new Australian loans are written at LVRs above 90 per cent compared to close to 50 per cent of new loans in countries that experienced a boom-bust cycle during the financial crisis (Kelly, Le Blanc and Lydon 2019).