Assessment of ASX Clearing and Settlement Facilities – October 2023 2. Overview of Ratings, Recommendations and Areas of Supervisory Focus

The Bank's Assessment of the ASX CCPs and SSFs has been undertaken against the Bank's Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties and Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities, as well as the CS facilities' more general obligation to do all other things necessary to reduce systemic risk.

The Bank has conducted this Assessment in accordance with its Approach to Supervising and Assessing Clearing and Settlement Facility Licensees.[1]

2.1 Ratings

The ratings for the current assessment period are set out in Table 1 below.

Table 1: 2023 Ratings of FSS Observance*
Standard ASX Clear ASX Clear (Futures) ASX Settlement Austraclear
Legal Basis (CCP/SSF Standard 1) Observed Observed Observed Observed
Governance (CCP/SSF 2) Partly observed
(↓)
Partly observed
(↓)
Partly observed
(↓)
Partly observed
(↓)
Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risks (CCP/SSF 3) Partly observed
(↓)
Partly observed
(↓)
Partly observed
(↓)
Partly observed
(↓)
Credit Risk (CCP/SSF 4) Broadly observed Broadly observed N/A N/A
Collateral (CCP/SSF 5) Observed Observed N/A N/A
Margin (CCP 6) Broadly observed Broadly observed N/A N/A
Liquidity Risk (CCP 7, SSF 6) Broadly observed Broadly observed Observed Observed
Settlement Finality (CCP 8, SSF 7) Observed Observed Observed Observed
Money Settlements (CCP 9, SSF 8) Observed Observed Observed Observed
Central Securities Depositories (SSF 9) N/A N/A Observed Broadly observed
(↓)
Physical Deliveries (CCP 10) N/A Observed N/A N/A
Exchange-of-value Settlements/Settlement Systems (CCP 11, SSF 10) Observed Observed Observed Observed
Participant Default Rules and Procedures (CCP 12, SSF 11) Observed Observed Observed Observed
Segregation and Portability (CCP 13) Observed Observed N/A N/A
General Business Risk (CCP 14, SSF 12) Observed Observed Observed Observed
Custody and Investment Risks (CCP 15, SSF 13) Observed Observed Observed(a) Observed
Operational Risk (CCP 16, SSF 14) Partly observed Partly observed Partly observed Partly observed
Access and Participation Requirements (CCP 17, SSF 15) Observed Observed Observed Observed
Tiered Participation Arrangements (CCP 18, SSF 16) Observed Observed Observed Observed
FMI Links (CCP 19, SSF 17) Observed Observed Observed Observed
Disclosure of Rules, Key Policies and Procedures, and Market Data (CCP 20, SSF 18) Observed Observed Observed Observed
Regulatory Reporting (CCP 21, SSF 19) Broadly observed Observed (↑) Broadly observed Observed (↑)

* Arrows in brackets indicate the ratings change from last year: an up arrow indicates an upgrade and a down arrow indicates a downgrade. ‘N/A’ means that the Bank has determined that the standard is not applicable, or an equivalent standard does not exist for the type of facility (e.g., for CCP Standard 6: Margin, there is no equivalent SSF Standard).

(a) In prior assessments, the Custody and Investment Risk FSS was previously assigned N/A for ASX Settlement.

2.2 Recommendations

The Bank has made new recommendations for the CS facilities to address. A complete list of open recommendations is provided in Appendix A. There are several recommendations that the Bank requires ASX to prioritise. These are as follows:

  • ASX should redouble its efforts to ensure that key issues are appropriately raised with the ASX boards to enable a robust level of challenge and focus. ASX should undertake a review of its board agendas, papers and minutes to strengthen the ability of the boards to debate and provide direction on the key issues raised in this Assessment.
  • ASX should assess and implement cultural changes required to remediate the relationship between Internal Audit and the executive, while ensuring that Internal Audit remains an independent source of challenge.
  • ASX should prioritise the implementation of short-term controls to mitigate the immediate risks of ageing assets. The Bank also recommends that ASX promptly devise and implement a comprehensive roadmap to remediate its currently identified ageing assets. ASX should also develop and implement a robust long-term strategy to ensure that technology assets are proactively managed and renewed well before they approach obsolescence.
  • ASX should implement a robust annual process of updating the CHESS Roadmap (ASX's plan for addressing support and maintenance requirements for the current CHESS) to ensure that all planned upgrades and material changes to CHESS are incorporated.
  • ASX should facilitate effective stakeholder engagement. In particular, it should actively consult stakeholders on the solution redesign, project and implementation timeline for CHESS replacement.

Following the ASX announcement of a pause in the CHESS Replacement Program in November 2022, the Bank published a letter on 15 December 2022 (the Letter of Expectations) setting out its expectations for the current CHESS and the CHESS replacement.[2] These expectations have been updated as appropriate to reflect developments and restated as recommendations in this Assessment.

2.3 Supervisory focus for the year to June 2024

The Bank has identified several areas of supervisory focus for the next assessment period (Table 2). The Bank also intends to carry out detailed reviews on segregation and portability and selected aspects of operational risk as part of its 2024 Assessment.

Table 2: Supervisory Focus for 2024 Assessment
Supervisory focus Standard Facility
Areas of supervisory focus

Risk culture. The Bank, along with ASIC, will monitor the operational effectiveness of uplifts made to risk culture and the first two lines of accountability.

For more information, see section 3.2.

CCP/SSF 3 All

Cyber resilience. The Bank, working closely with ASIC, will review:

  • adjustments to the ASX Cyber Strategy
  • adjustments to ASX's cyber security practices, including plans to address any actions identified through ASX's review of alignment with domestic and international cyber resilience frameworks and maturity models
  • ASX's analysis of technologies to support safe recovery of operations within two hours following an extreme cyber-attack.

For more information, see section 3.3.

CCP 16, SSF 14 All
Special topics

The Bank will carry out a detailed review of the ASX CS facilities management of:

  • Segregation and portability
  • Operational risk (including ageing assets, vendor management, resource sufficiency and the ASX Group Support Agreement).

The Bank will also conduct a review of:

  • Tiered participation.

CCP 13

CCP 16, SSF 14

CCP 18, SSF 16

Both CCPs

All

All

Other ongoing reviews progressing during 2024

Legal certainty of intragroup agreements.

  • The legal certainty of arrangements for ASX Limited to replenish ASX contributions to the CCPs' default funds.
  • The ASX Group Support Agreement, covering aspects outside the scope of the 2018/19 special topic assessment of the CS facilities' legal basis (to be covered as part of the special topic on Operational Risk).

For more information, see Appendix A, Table 5.

CCP 1, 14 SSF 12 All
Margin. The Bank will continue engagement with ASX to review the processes and controls it uses to help ensure the reliability of its margin-related operations, as well as its back-up procedures in the event of an outage affecting the systems it uses to calculate and collect margin. CCP 6 Both CCPs